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IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: 
A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
David R. Cleveland* and Steven Wisotsky** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Federal appellate practice is not what is used to be. In the 
1970s, oral argument was routinely granted and it was 
generously sized at thirty min.utes per side. After a period of 
dramatic shrinkage in both frequency and length in the 1980s 1 
and 1990s, the role of oral argument has been greatly 
diminished. It is now the exception rather than the rule. In 2011, 
only one quarter of all federal appeals were orally ·argued,2 down 
*Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University Law School. 
**Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University. 
1. As long ago as 1983, Justice Rehnquist described the "continuing demise" of oral 
argument. William H. Rehnquist, Oral Advocacy: A Disappearing Art, 35 Mercer L. Rev. 
1015, 1016 (1983-84)., See Part V, infra, for examination of oral argument's seeming slide 
toward demise in the federal courts of appeals. 
2. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 2011 Annual Report of the Director: 
Judicial Business of the United States Courts 36 (20 12) (tbl. S-1: "U.S. Courts of 
App,eals Appeals Terminated on the Merits after Oral Hearings or Submission on Briefs 
During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2011") [hereinafter "201 1 AO 
Reporf']. The reader should note that these statistics do not include totals for the Federal 
Circuit. /d. 
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from nearly two-thirds in the early 1980s, 3 and the time allotted 
in most circuits was limited to fifteen minutes or less. 
. . . . . 
The drastic reduction in the frequency of oral argument and 
its length has been driven largely by considerations of efficiency 
as reflected in the universal adoption of case-screening methods 
that shunt aside the majority of cases to a summary or non-
arglJment calendar.4 This separate decisional track involves "a 
significantly lesser degree of personal attention by judges"5 by 
placing "primary reliance for the operation of the screening 
process on a centralltorganized, parajudicially-supervised 
group of staff attorneys." 
· The federal rule on this issue acknowledges the importance 
of oral argument, but in practice permits it to be both brief and 
rare.
7 Procedural efficiency comes with a cost,8 of course, and 
the extraordinary reduction in oral argument has diminished its 
role.9 The decline of oral argument has been one casualty of the 
procedural reforms made in respons_e to the crisis of cas_eload 
3. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1980 Annual Report of the Director: 
Judicial Business of the United States Courts (tbl. S-1: "U.S. Courts of Appeals Appeals 
Tenninated on the Merits_ after Oral Hearing or Submission on Briefs During the 12-Month 
Period Ending September 30, 1980") [hereinafter "1980 A 0 Report"]. 
4. Thomas E. Baker, Rationing Justice on Appeal, 108-17 (West 1994). 
5. John B. Oakley, The Screening of Appeals: The Ninth Circuit's Experience in the 
Eighties and Innovations for the Nineties, 1991 BYU L.Rev. 859,860. 
6. /d. Screening programs vary somewhat from circuit to circuit, but the majority are 
based on the prototype pioneered by the Fifth Circuit in the 1970s. /d. at 865-66. 
7. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) (Westlaw 2012) (providing that ''oral argument must be 
allowed in every case unless a panel of three judges who have examined the briefs and 
record unanimously agrees that oral argument is 1.IDfle_cessary"). 
8. Mark R: Kravitz, Words to the Wise, 5 J. App. Prac. & Process 543, 544 (2003) 
(asserting that appellate courts, federal and state, have "increasingly sacrificed oral 
argument on the altar of 'efficiency'"); Lauren K. Robel, Case/oad and Judging: Judicial 
Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 BYU L. Rev. 3, 4 (discussing appellate courts' "survival 
responses" to burgeoning dockets); Wade H. McCree, Jr., Bureaucratic Justice: An Early 
Warning, 129 u·. Pa. L. Rev. 777, 777-78 (1981) (stating that refonns implemented to 
increase efficiency in the federal judiciary have led to "significant costs to the quality of 
justice''); Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the 
Federal Courts, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 11, 13 (1996) (opining that "[m]easures adopted to cope 
with rising caseloads have exacerbated the 'crisis' by sharply altering time-honored 
traditions of appellate justice"); Baker, supra n. 4, at 114 (arguing that "the design of the 
system has been compromised, severely and profoundly, and possibly irredeemably, by 
such proportionally high rates of denial of oral argument"). 
9. Baker, supra n. 4, at 113 (pointing out that "the [oral argument] denial rate seems to 
have outgrown the announced justification for denial") . 
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volumes that began in the 1980s.10 Reduction in oral argument 
has been described as a response to pressure, taken almost 
against the courts' own will. 11 
The result is a more efficient but more paper-driven 
bureaucratic process of appellate decisionmaking. There is less 
input from the lawyers. The values implicit in appellate review 
are weakened or diluted. 12 Moreover, there is a disturbing 
appearance of correlation between the decline in frequency of 
oral argument and the decline in reversal rates in both civil and 
criminal cases. For example, Judge John Godbold cited data in 
1994 showing a decline of one half in the overall federal 
appellate reversal rate from 1982 to 1993, from 19.9 percent to 
10.3 percent, with a significant decline in every category of 
appeal. 13 By 2 0 11 , the reversal rate had fallen further, to 8. 9 
percent overall and 5.8 percent in criminal cases. 14 
Could the decline in reversal rates and the decline in 
frequency of oral argument be coincidental? They could. Or one 
might say that better screening procedures have increased the 
accuracy of appellate decision making to a more "correct" 
reversal rate than the historic figures. But one might also 
reasonably suspect that the very same process that shunts the 
vast majority of cases to the summary calendar is responsible for 
an institutional readiness to dispose of the cases by affirming the 
decisions below. Thus, the authors fear, though they are not the 
first to do so, that "[w]e have lowered our expectations for 
appellate procedure. We have defmed down our appellate 
10. Robert J. Martineau, The Value of Appellate Oral Argument: A Challenge to the 
Conventional Wisdonz, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 3 (1986). 
II. /d. at 3-4 ("To most observers of and participants in the appellate process, these 
restrictions on oral argument are highly regrettable, forced upon the courts by an 
overwhelming caseload, and adopted only with great reluctance."). 
12. Oakley, supra n. 5, at 865 (contrasting cases screened off the regular argument 
calendar with those that remain on it). Professor Oakley identifies four such values under 
the following rubrics: error correction; institutional impact; a sense of participation; and 
legitimation of judicial decisions. /d. at 869-7l.These and other values are discussed below 
in Part IV. 
13. Steven Wisotslcy, Professional Judgment on Appeal: Bringing and Opposing 
Appeals 12 (2d ed. Carolina Academic Press 2009) (citing John C. Godbold, Twenty Pages 
and Twenty Minutes Revisited 2 (Rec. J. of the Fla. B. Sec. of App. Prac. & Advoc. Mar. 
1994)). 
14. 2011 AO Report, supra n. 2, at 89 (tbl. B-5: "U.S. Courts of Appeals Appeals 
Terminated on the Merits, by Circuit, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 
2011 "). 
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values. We all have internalized the postmodern norms of the 
minimalist procedural paradigm." 15 
Oral argument is too central to the appellate process and 
too valuable to sacrifice on the altar of efficiency. We propose a 
return to a greater role for oral advocacy. 16 Part I of this article 
briefly outlines the importance of oral presentation in Western 
culture, modem communication, and traditional common law 
argument. Part II collects the federal rule of appellate procedure 
and corresponding local rules and internal operating procedures 
that govern the grant, or more often the denial, of oral argument. 
Part III examines the numerous and varied values of appellate 
justice that are served by oral argument. Part IV demonstrates 
the dramatic decline of oral argument since 1970. Finally, the 
authors propose modest refonns for restoring a greater role for 
oral argument in the federal courts of appeals. 
II. HISTORICAL VALUE OF ORAL DISCOURSE AND ARGUMENT 
The power of oral argument was known to the ancient 
philosophers. "One of the persistent themes of Western thought 
since Plato is that speech is a superior form of communication to 
writing."17 The Greeks "regarded writing simply as a method of 
chronicling. Their test was always the spoken word.''18 Plato, for 
example_, recounts a dialogue between Socrates and Phaedrus 
expressing the necessity and humanity of oral dialogue and its 
15. Thomas E. Baker, Applied Freakonomics: Explaining the HCrisis of Volume" 8 J. 
App. Prac. & Process I 01, 114 (2006). 
16. Calls to preserve, restore, or merely value oral argument are certainly not new, but 
now that the language and rhetoric of the "crisis of volume" have died down, perhaps there 
is an opportunity to rethink these issues in a new light See Baker, supra n. 4; Paul D. 
Carrington, et al., Justice on Appeal (West 1976); Daniel J. Meador, Toward Orality and 
Visibility in the Appellate Process, 42 Md. L. Rev.. 732 (1983); Mark R. Kravitz, Written 
and Oral Persuasion in the United States Courts: A District Judge's Perspective on Their 
History, Functioh, and Future, 10 J. App. Prac. & Process 24 7 (2009); Martineau, supra n. 
10, at 1; see also Baker, supra n. 15, at 102 (noting that discussion about a court in crisis 
seems to have vanished, giving way to a perception of "business as usual" in the federal 
courts of appeals). 
17. Suzanne Ehrenberg, Embracing the Writing Centered Legal Process, 89 Iowa L. 
Rev. 1159, 1161 (2004). 
18. Kravitz, supra n. 16, at 248 (quoting Oscar Wilde, The Critic as Artist, in Plays, 
Prose Writings and Poems 1, 12 (Alfred A. Knopf 1991)). 
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superiority to writing. 19 As Socrates explains, true knowledge 
and understanding is hampered by fixing one's thoughts into a 
writing, which fosters misunderstanding and cannot be 
questioned further because a writing "produce[s] the same 
unvarying meaning, over and over again. "2° Communication 
must be tailored to the speaker and the listener, he argues, and 
sown not in ink but in the soul.21 
Socrates urged Phaedrus to tell the speechwriters, including 
the law-makers, 
that if their compositions are based on knowledge of the 
truth, and they can defend or prove them, when they are put 
to the test, by spoken arguments, which leave their writings 
poor in comparison of them, then they are to be called, not 
only poets, orators, legislators, but are worthi of a higher 
name, befitting the serious pursuit of their life. 2 
These notions of the humanity, gravity, and interactivity of oral 
discourse are important in pursuing appellate justice. 
An early communications scholar of the modern era, 
Harold Innis, argued that a balance of oral and written 
communications promoted the intellectual greatness of ancient 
Greece.23 Plato's preservation, in writing, of the dialogues of 
Socrates, which were oral, captured the strengths of both forms 
of communication. Professor Innis favored this "use of 
dialogues, allegories and illustrations" to capt1..1re the benefits of 
spoken language and interaction and fix it for future readers.24 
Modem American legal practice, particularly at the 
appellate level, has tilted heavily toward written communication 
19. Plato, Phaedrus, in Selected Dialogues of Plato (Benjamin Jowett trans., Modem 
Library 2000); see also Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the 
Word (2d ed., Routledge 2002); Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making 
of Typographic Man (U. Toronto Press 1962). 
20. Plato, supra n. 19, at 191. 
21. /d.; see also id. at 194-95 ("only in principles of justice and goodness and nobility 
taught and communicated orally for the sake of instruction and inscribed on the soul ... is 
there clearness and perfection and seriousness"). 
22. Id. at 195. 
23. Harold Innis, Empire and Communications 53-84 (U. Toronto Press 1972) (chapter 
4: "The Oral Tradition and Greek Civilization"). 
24. ld. at 57. Likewise, this perceived balance of written submissions and oral 
argument was also praised by Professor Martineau in his comparative examination of the 
English and American appellate systems. See generally Robert J. Martineau, Appellate 
Justice in England and the United States: A Comparative Analysis (W.S. Hein 1990). 
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and away from oral communication. Advocates present in 
writing rather than engaging and connecting· in person. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist once recounted a tale of a New York appellate 
judge who chastised an attorney for reading from his brief in 
violation of a court rule prohibiting argument in that form.25 The 
judge explained the court rule and reasoned that the court had 
read the brief.26 Counsel in his own defense proclaimed, "Yes, 
but you have not heard it with gestures."27 The point of the story 
is that there is an important dimension to communication 
beyond word choice. The power and value of an oral 
presentation is its potential to engage the decisionmakers. As 
Chief Justice Rehnquist put it, "the more flesh and blood you 
can insert into it, as opposed to a dry recitation of principles of 
law or decided cases, the more interesting and effective that 
argument can be."28 What the Chief Justice's comments speak to 
is the visceral, engaging, and human nature of oral discourse, 
attributes that are stripped from our justice system in what is, for 
the vast majority of cases, a desiccated text-only process. 
Appeals in the English courts have been largely conducted 
through oral presentation and argument since the e-arly days of 
the common law. 29 The same is true in most other common law 
countries. 30 Professor Ehrenberg has extensively examined the 
divergence between the English and American systems on the 
issue of oral argument. As she summarizes, "[ o ]ral advocacy is 
the heart of the English legal system."31 Another extensive study 
of the English and American appellate processes concluded that 
''[t]he heart of the English legal system and u:Eon which all 
major aspects of it are based is the oral tradition.'' 
Traditionally, English barristers did not file lengthy written 
submissions to· the court but orally educated the court on the 
25. Relmquist, supra n. 1, at 1 024. 
26. /d. 
27. /d. 
28. !d. 
29. Ehrenberg, supra n. 17, at 1162. 
30. ld. at 1162, 1166 n. 20. Interestingly, the other common law nation to .emphasize 
written over oral advocacy is Canada, though even it does not require extensive written 
briefing in the American style before the intennediate appellate court. /d. at 1166, 1166 n. 
19. 
31. I d. at 1166. 
32. Martineau, supra n. 24, at 101. 
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facts, law, and argument over the course of hours.33 In many 
cases, even the judges' deliberations would be made in open 
court.34 Though comparatively time-consuming for judges 
(though not necessarily for lawyers, who under the system in the 
United States would devote far more time to the writing of 
appellate briefs), the system has several benefits. First, it brings 
the entire process of argument and decisionmaking into public 
view. It puts the decisionmakers, advocates, and individuals 
whose lives are affected together in the same room for an 
extended period of time, emphasizing the gravity and humanity 
of the task. Second, it makes the entire enterprise interactive, 
allowing the judges and lawyers to engage in a manner that 
addresses one another's concerns and to probe the areas of 
ambiguity in the case. The lawyer gains greater assurance that 
his points are understood, even if they are ultimately rejected, 
and the court is better able to interrogate the counsel regarding 
issues that might be obscured in the written briefing. Oral 
argument enhances understanding. To dispense with it is a loss 
like teaching a law school class by reading judicial opinions 
aloud without discussion or question and answer. 
Appellate practice in England was an overwhelmingly oral 
one from the early common law until the mid-twentieth 
century.35 Few written records were produced at trial, typically 
just the court's record of the pleading and the court's sum.Inary 
of its judgment, and submission of the case on appeal was an 
oral not written process. 36 Litigants aggrieved by a trial court 
judgment would argue their case, informing the court of the 
defects in the trial court's judgment and receiving an oral 
judgment from the court.37 Every aspect of the case, even the 
written record from the trial court, was presented orally by the 
advocates rather than reviewed in chambers by judges before the 
hearing. 38 Oral argument was less in the manner of modem 
American argumentation and more of "a continuing discussion 
of the relevant facts and cases, with both counsel and the judges 
33. Ehrenberg, supra n. 17, at 1167. 
34. /d. 
35. Id. at 1174. 
36. /d. at 1174-75. 
37. ld. 
38. ld. at 1176. 
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contributing when appropriate."39 This process existed in both 
the earliest appeals, heard by a panel of trial judges, and in the 
later era where appeals were heard by an independent appellate 
judiciary.40 
. Modem English apgeals are conducted in a similar, alm~st 
enttrely oral manner. The appellate courts have qutte 
consciously considered and rejected the writing-centered 
approach of United States appeals.42 English courts rejected 
sugg_estions that they increase the use- of written submissions, 
and review by judges without the participation of lawyers was 
rejected throughout the mid-twentieth century.43 A committee in 
the 1950s, an experiment in the 1960s, and study in the 1970s all 
arrived at the same conclusion: The traditional oral appellate 
process was preferable.44 In the 1980s, English appe-als first 
permitted; then required, a brief written statement from the 
parties of the issues on appeal.45 That statement was intended 
only to identify the issues, not argue the case.46 The strengths of 
this oral-centered process are the assurances that the process of 
educating the bench was open and interactive and that the 
process of open deliberation was more publicly accountable and 
resulted in fewer dissents.47 B,y contrast, the written process has 
' 
been viewed as more time-consuming and costly overall, and 
especially for litigants.48 
Appellate cases in the United States in the founding era 
were conducted in a similar manner, with oral arguments 
playing_ a dominant role and taking whatever time was 
necessary, even when that was several days.49 The first domestic 
push to create a body of professional lawyers required putative 
lawyers to learn by reading the law, especially the reports of 
Coke and Blackstone, typically at the office of an existing 
39. Martineau, supra n. 10, at 7. 
40. Ehrenberg, supra n. 17, at 1175. 
41. !d. at 1176. 
42. !d. 
43. !d. 
44. /d. at 1176, 1176 n. 88. 
45. !d. at 1177. 
46. ld. at 1177; see also Martineau, supra n. 24, at 129-30. 
4 7. Ehrenberg, supra n. 17, at 1176. 
48. Id. 
49. /d. at 1179. 
REFORMING ORAL ARGUMENT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 127 
. . . . . 
lawyer. 50 Training by an English Inn of Court or in the 
traditional, oral-centered English manner was rare. Much of the 
colonial era litigation was ''conducted by attorneys who lacked 
the classic education and legal training of the English barrister, 
and who had ~~5 political motive to preserve a system based on oral advocacy. 
Combined with this new type of lawyer was the new type 
of nation, a very large and expanding one. The written word 
became an important tool for all branches of government, 
including the law, to conduct their business over this large 
land~52 The importance of writing in early America was also 
driven by this new nation's considerable distrust between 
legislatures and courts, leading to statutory requirements of 
written opinions as well as increasing courts' desire to explain 
their rulings. 53 Moreover, the new American legal system had a 
need and desire to create its own body of law and precedent, a 
goal facilitated by greater reliance on writing. 54 
This ascendancy of writing-centered appellate practice can 
be seen in the United States Supreme Court practice, which by 
1795 began to require a statement of the key points at issue, 
similar to that adopted by the English courts only in the late 
1980s. 55 By 1833, parties could submit a brief in lieu of 
argument and in 1849 the Court set a two-hour per attorney limit 
1 56 on ora argument. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, that time was further 
limited to two hours per side.57 But "[t]he emphasis on oratory 
50. David R. Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone, 10 J. App. Prac. & Process 61, 
78-79 (20 1 0); cf Kravitz, supra n. 16, at 249 (noting that American law borrowed from 
Blackstone and Coke in the early years of the republic). 
51.- Ehrenberg, supra n. 17, at 1180. 
52. !d. 
53. Kravitz, supra n. 16, at 255-56; see also Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the 
American Revolution 323-25 (Alfred A. Knopf 1992) (outlining the-rise of an independent 
judiciary and noting_ that "[t]he desire for an independent expert judiciary was bred by the 
continuing ... fears of democratic politics") (footnote omitted). 
54. Kravitz, supra n. 16; at 256; Cleveland, supra n. 50, at 80-81. 
55. Ehrenberg, supra n. 17, at 1181. 
56. ld. 
57. Kravitz, supra n. 16, at 252-53; see also A Good Quarrel: America,s Top Legal 
Reporters Share Stories from Inside the Supreme Court 6 (Timothy R. Johnson and Jerry 
Goldman eds., U. Mich. Press 2009) [hereinafter A Good Quarrel]. Chief Justic_e Burg~r 
• 
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in the Supreme Court nonetheless continued well into the 
nineteenth century," as evidenced by the six-day argument in 
Gibbons v. Ogden in 1821 and the eight-day argument in the 
Amistad case in 1841.58 
The shift from oral hearing to written submission followed 
a similar pattern in the state courts throughout the nineteenth 
century.59 By the early twentieth century, the American practice 
of oral argument supplementing extensive written briefs had 
supplanted the English practice of extensive oral hearing 
supplemented by minimal written documents. 60 While lengthy 
oral hearing providing a full examination, deliberation, and 
decision of a case has been replaced by a more succinct and 
constricted oral arg•Jtnent, oral argument remains a fundamental 
part of the American appellate tradition.61 
Oral argument of appeals was a traditional feature of the 
federal appellate process until relatively recently, accounting for 
nearly two-thirds of the case dispositions in 1971, 1981, and 
1982. As to length of oral argument, in mid-twentieth century 
most American courts reportedly permitted an hour of oral 
argument per side, though that time was reduced in many federal 
courts of appeals by the mid-1970s.62 Now oral argument is 
granted in a very small percentage of cases. 63 This decline in the 
grants of, and time for, oral argument was protested by the 
American Bar Association.64 Contemporary scholars expressed 
similar concerns. Professors Carrington, Meador, and Rosenberg 
expressed their regret at the trend of diminished oral argument, 
and they proposed the following as a rule that adequately valued 
later reduced oral argument before the Court to thirty minutes per side. A Good Qua"e/, 
supra this note, at 6. 
58. Kravitz, supra n. 16, at 251; see also R. Kirkland Cozine, The Entergence of 
Written Appellate Briefs in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 38 Am. J. Leg. History 
482, 488 (1994) (pointing out that in "the first half of the nineteenth century ... , oral 
argument was available to counsel in unlimited amount"). 
59. Ehrenberg, supra n. 17, at 1182. 
60. !d. at 1183. 
61. Carrington, supra n. 16, at 16-17; Baker, supra n. 4, at I 09 (asserting that "denying 
oral argument runs counter to American appellate tradition"). 
62. Carrington, supra n. 16, at 16-17 ("Not many decades ago, the noun in many 
American appellate courts was to allow an hour to each side."). 
63. See Part V, infra. 
64. Carrington, supra n. 16, at 18 n. 4 (pointing out that the ABA's House of Delegates 
opposed rules eliminating or curtailing oral argument). 
• 
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and protected oral argument: 
Oral argument will be heard in every appeal that is to be 
decided on its merits if any party or any member of the 
court requests it. In any case in which oral argument has 
been requested by a party, the court may in the prescribed 
manner invite, but may not require, all parties to waive it. 
The length of the argument will be determined by the court 
with due regard for the ooportunity of eac-h party to make 
d. . 6~ an a equate presentatton. 
In 1983, Professor Meador made a much broader call for 
greater orality in appeals.66 His proposal was to reduce the 
written filings to identifying the issues and allow for oral 
argument and conference in the unlimited English tradition, at 
least for some cases.67 Such a practice would be a better balance 
of written and oral communication, reduce the duplication 
caused by both extensive written briefing and lengthy oral 
arguments, and preserve the value of the appellate advocate in 
the process.68 This proposal found support from the ABA and 
others, but its particulars were deemed impractical in the high-
volume, geographically dispersed, and efficiency-minded 
modern American appellate system. 69 
In an attempt to set a national minimum, the Hruska 
Conunission had reported even earlier that 
[b ]ecause conditions vary substantially from circuit to 
circuit, each court of appeals should have the authority to 
establish its own standards, so long as the -national 
minimum is satisfied, and to provide ·procedures for 
implementation which are particularly suited to local 
needs,70 
65. ld. at 18. 
66. Meador, supra n. 16, at 749 (suggesting an oral-argument procedure based on the 
English model that would be '\an amalgam of counsel's presentation of argument and 
authority, the judges' probing of counsel; and the judges' conferring among themselves"). 
67. Id. 
68. Baker, supra n. 4, at 165-66 (quoting American Bar Association, Action 
Commission to Reduce Court Costs and Delay, Attacking Litigation Costs and Delay 26-
27 (ABA 1984)). 
69. !d. (citing several state experiments with such a practice and a 1984 ABA 
commission report calling for ''curtailing briefs, while preserving oral argument"). 
70. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and 
Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change., 67 F.R.D. 195, 201 (1975) 
[hereinafter Hroska Commission Report]. 
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and proposed what is now embodied in Rule 34(a).71 The 
proposed national minimum was intended as a check on some 
local rules that permitted denial of oral argument whenever the 
court felt the case was of such a character that it did not justify 
oral argument.72 In reality, it was an equally vague and 
subjective standard, now promulgated on a nationwide scale,73 
and it led to the present state of oral argument in the federal 
courts, making it a rare and fleeting occurrence. 
III. CURRENT ORAL ARGUMENT RULES OF THE 
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 
Rule 34 governs the pant or denial of oral argument in the 
federal courts of appeals. 7 
The standard for oral argument set by Rule 34(2) is to 
allow for oral argument "in every case unless a panel of three 
judges who have examined the briefs and record unanimously 
agrees that oral argument is unnecessary," and sets out the 
following reasons to guide the panel in making that decision: 
A. the appeal is frivolous; 
B. the dispositive issue or issues have been 
authoritatively decided; or 
C. the facts and legal arguments are adequately 
presented in the briefs and record, and the decisional 
process would not be significantly aided by oral 
75 
argument. 
This text certainly seems to favor oral argument, as indeed it 
71. !d. 
72.. Baker, supra n. 4, at 108-09 (quoting Charles R. Haworth; Circuit Splitting and the 
HNew·' National Court of Appeals: Can the Mouse Roar? 30 Sw. L.J. 839, 866 (1976)). 
73. See Fed R. App. P. 34; see also Part III, infra (discussing circularity and inefficacy 
of rule). 
74. Fed R. App. P. 34. That rule is supplemented by local rules and internal operating 
procedures in the circuits to govern local practices. See D.C. Cir. R. 34 & D.C. Cir. I.O.P. 
XI; 1st Cir. R. 34.0 & 1st Cir. I.O.P. VIII; 2d Cir. R. 34.1-34.2; 3d Cir. R. 34.1-34.3 & 3d 
Cir. J.O.P. 2.1-2.5; 4th Cir. R. 34(a)-(e) & 4th Cir. I.O.P. 34.1-34.3; 5th Cir. R. 34.1-
34.13 & 5th Cir. I.O.P. 34; 6th Cir. R. 34(a)-(g) & 6th Cir. l.O.P. 34 (a)-{d); 7th Cir. R. 
34(a)-(h) & 7th Cir. O.P. l(c)(7) (characterizing any order issued pursuant to Fed. R. App. 
P. 34 as "nonroutine"); 8th Cir. R. 34A, 34B & 8th Cir. I.O.P. I(D)( 1 )-(2) (describing 
argument and hearing panels), III(K); 9th Cir. R. 34( 1 )-(3) & advisory comm. n. 2; I Oth 
Cir. R. 34.1; 11th Cir. R. 34(1)--(4) & lith Cir. l.O.P. 1-16 (pertaining to lith Cir. R. 34). 
75. Fed R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(A)-{C). 
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was so intended.76 But the exceptions listed in parts A, B, and C 
are so broad that they effectively swallow the rule. The 
traditional default position in favor of oral argument for appeals 
has given way, even under the rule of this "minimum standard," 
to a default of no argument. 77 
Part A seems a suitably narrow and reasonable exception. 
No oral argument is needed in a case that is frivolous on its face. 
"Frivolous" as a legal standard is an exceptionally low bar and is 
traditionally examined at the outset of a proceeding. 78 Part B, 
"when the dispositive issue or issues have been authoritatively 
decided,'' is merely a type of frivolous appeal.79 Finally, Part C 
is the catch-all provision, which institutionalizes the very local 
rule formulations that Rule 34 was supposed to counter. Rule 
34(a)(l)(C) grants the court the authority to deny oral argument 
whenever its members think oral argument is unnecessary (that 
is, when the "decisional process would not be significantly aided 
by oral argument.")80 This provision begs the question. The 
conclusion reached, that oral argument is unnecessary, is 
justified by the conclusion that oral argument is unnecessary. As 
federal court exJert Thomas E. Baker explains: "This is not a 
standard at all." 
The local rules and internal operating procedures in almost 
every circuit do not alter or supplement the test for granting or 
denying oral argument set out in the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.82 Several are entirely silent on the standard or merely 
76. Hruska Commission Report, 67 F.R.D. at 200-01. 
77. See Part V, infra (detailing the decline and present rarity of oral argument). 
78. Steven Wisotsky, Professional Judgment on Appeal: Bringing and Opposing 
Appeals 242 (2d. ed. Carolina Academic P. 2009). 
79. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(B). 
80. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(l)(C). 
81. Baker, supra n. 4, at 109. 
82. Fed. Cir. I.O.P. 7(2) (restating the text of Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)); 1st Cir. R. 34.0 
& 1st Cir. I.O.P. VIII (relying on standard of grant/denial of oral argument in Fed. R. App. 
P. 34(a)(2)); 3d Cir. R. 34. l(a) (restating the requirement of unanimity stated in Fed. R. 
App. P. 34(a)(2)); 4th Cir. R. 34(a)(2) (providing that the standard to be applied will be the 
same as found in Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)); 5th Cir. R. 34 (referring briefly to Fed. R. App. 
P. 34(a)(2) as the governing standard); 6th Cir. R. 34 (relying sub silentio on Fed. R. App. 
P. 34(a)(2) standard for grant or denial of oral argument); 7th Cir. R. 34(4) (mentioning 
only briefly that the standards of Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) are controlling); 8th Cir. R. 34A & 
8th Cir. I.O.P. I(D) (relying sub silentio on standard of grant/denial of oral argument in 
Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2), and referring to the federal rule in a cross-reference); lOth Cir. R. 
34.l(G) (allowing "[s]ubmission on briefs," and providing that ''[e]xcept in prose appeals 
• 
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restate or refer to Rule 34.83 By contrast, the Third Circuit offers 
additional guidelines to suggest when oral argument is more 
likely to be granted. 84 It also offers language suggesting that oral 
argument is the default. The internal operating procedures of the 
Third Circuit explain: 
lOP 2.4.1 Experience discloses that judges usually find oral 
argument unnecessary when: 
(a) The issue is tightly constrained, not novel, and the 
briefs adequately cover the arguments; 
(b) The outcome of the appeal is clearly controlled by 
a decision of the Supreme Court or this court; or 
(c) The state of the record will determine the outcome 
and the sole issue is either sufficiency of the evidence, 
the adequacy of jury instructions, or rulings as to 
admissibility of evidence, and the briefs adequately 
refer to the record. 
lOP 2.4.2 Experience discloses that judges usually vote for 
oral argument when: 
(a) The appeal presents a substantial and novel legal 
• 
ISSUe; 
(b) The resolution of an issue presented by the appeal 
will be of institutional or precedential value; 
(c) A judge has questions to ask counsel to clarify an 
important legal, factual, or procedural point; 
(d) A decision, legislation, or an event subsequent to 
the filing of the last brief may significantly bear on 
the case; or 
(e) An important public interest may be affected. 85 
or when both parties have waived oral argument, the court will advise the parties when a 
panel decides that oral argument is not necessary"); 11th Cir. R. 34-3(b) (expressly stating 
that standard to be applied will be the minimum standard found in Fed. R. App. P. 
34(a)(2)). 
83. See generally n. 82, supra. 
84. 3d Cir. I.O.P. 2.4 ("Suggested Criteria for Oral Argument''). 
85. Id. 
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These guidelines certainly provide a greater basis for 
examining the suitability of a case for oral argument. They are 
not binding on a panel, however, because the criteria set out in 
them "shall not be construed to limit any judge's discretion in 
voting for oral argument. "86 This particular set of guidelines as 
well as the phrasing of lOP 2.4.3 certainly seems both to favor 
oral argument and to provide a more rational basis for sorting 
cases into argument and non-argument categories. The Fifth 
Circuit does not alter the standard in any substantive way, but it 
does suggest that the parties' preference for oral argument be 
given "due, but not controlling, weight. "87 Even such a mild 
suggestion about the importance of the parties' wishes or about 
oral argument itself is largely absent from the local rules and 
procedures of most circuits. Regardless of the intention of the 
Hruska Commission report or the seeming value of oral 
argument in the text of Rule 34(a)(2) itself, the written standard 
has been unsuccessful at preserving oral argument or providing 
~ meanin§ftul basis for judging when oral argument is 
tmportant. 
The problem extends beyond merely the written standard, 
however. The rule as written requires a unanimous decision by 
the "panel of three judges who have examined the briefs and 
record" to deny oral argument. 89 This type of review does not 
occur in cases sent to a non-argument calendar based on the 
category or type of appeal. For example, the Second Circuit 
automatically denies argument in several types of immigration 
86. 3d Cir. I.O.P. 2.4.3. 
87. 5th Cir. R. 28.2.3. 
88. See Part V, infra (describing the numerical and durational decline of oral argwnent 
in the federal appellate courts). This decline stands in striking parallel to the federal 
appellate courts' rules and practices on unpublished opinions. While the local rules often 
set forth a basis for issuing opinions as published or unpublished, with a stated preference 
for traditional publication, the actual practice has been a steadily declining rate of 
publication such that only a small fraction of court dispositions are issued as fully 
recognized published opinions. See David R. Cleveland, Local Rules in the Wake of 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 11 J. App. Prac. & Process l9, 27-42 (2011). 
89. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 
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,appeals.90 It ,also leaves open the possibility that other classes-of 
cases, in addition to individual cases, might be deemed not 
worthy of oral ar~ment and, as a class, shunted to the non-
argument calendar.91 This seems incompatible with the Rule 34 
requirement that all cases be given oral argument unless a three-
judge panel, having reviewed the brief and record, rules 
otherwise.92 
But categorical denial of oral argument is not the only 
troubling practice. Even where each case is looked at 
individually, the question of who is making the decision to grant 
or deny oral argument, both practically and technically, is an 
issue in some circuits. Most circuits have a three-judge panel 
make the decision on whether to grant oral argument, consistent 
with Rule 34.93 But some circuits, at least based upon their local 
rules and procedures as written, seem to allow the staff to make 
the initial screening decision, which is then implicitly or 
explicitly reversible by the hearing panel. The Eighth Circuit's 
local rules, for example, permit a clerk or senior staff attorney to 
screen cases into argument and non-argument categories, though 
the case can be reclassified by the hearing panel.94 The Ninth 
Circuit also seems to pertnit the: clerk's office and staff attorneys 
to determine whether a case is "eligible for submission without 
oral argument under Rule 34(a),'' and to place that case on the 
I d. 
90. See 2d Cir. R. 34.2(a)(l): 
(I) Immigration. An appeal or petition for review, and any related motion, in 
which a party seeks review of the denial of: 
(A) a claim for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA); 
(B) a claim for withholding of removal under the INA; 
(C) a claim for withholding or deferral of removal under the Convention 
Against Torture; or 
(D) a motion to reopen or reconsider an order involving one of the claims 
listed above. 
91. 2d Cir. R. 34.2(a)(2) (allowing use of the non-argument calendar as the default for 
"[a]ny other class of cases that the court identifies as appropriate for the [Non-Argument 
Calendar]''). 
92. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a). 
93. For example, in the Eleventh Circuit, it seems clear that a panel of judges is doing 
the screening. 11th Cir. R. 34-3(b) ("When a panel of judges of the court unanimously 
detennines, after an examination of the briefs and records, that an appeal of a party falls 
within one of the three categories of Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) ... that appeal will be-placed 
on the non-argument calendar for submission and decision without oral argument."). 
94. 8th Cir. R. 34A(a), (c). 
I 
-
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non-argument calendar.95 Overruling the staffs placement of the 
appeal on the non-argument ("screening") calendar, can be done 
by the judges after hearing the staffs presentation about the 
case.
96 
Though other circuits' rules describe the role of staff in 
screening cases for argument, and doubtless some have 
procedures not explicated in the local rules, they tend· to describe 
the staffs role ·as more advisory and less determinative. For 
example, a Sixth Circuit lOP once explained that '~[t]he staff 
attorney section reviews this court's docket to identify cases 
which offer the possibility of decision without oral argument," 
and that while the staff attorneys provide the he,aring panel with 
a memorandum explainin,g the case and the possibility of 
decision without argument, the panel of judges makes the 
decision.97 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit IOP describes a 
process by which a staff recommendation is sent first to a single 
judge and then to two additional judges, and oral argument is 
rejected only upon unanimity of all three judges.98 This seems 
more appropriate and consistent with Rule 34 than a system that 
allows non-judicial determination subje-ct to judicial reversa1.99 
Of course, there are some innovations in the local rules that 
increase the opportunity for oral argument or add small 
consolation procedures in recognition of the loss occasioned by 
denial of argument. For example, the Sixth Circuit's local rule 
95. 9th Cir. Gen. Ord. VI. 6.5(a), (b) (Nov. 1, 2011). 
96. 9th Cir. R. 34; 9th Cir. Gen. Ord. VI. 6.5(b)(i) (''The staff attorneys shall orally 
present the proposed dispositions to the scre,ening panels . . . , the panel members discuss 
the proposed disposition and make any necessary revisions," and "if the three panel 
members unanimously agree," the staff attorney's proposed disposition is certified); 9th 
Cir. Gen. Ord. VI. 65(b) (ii) ("All three judges must agree that the case is suitable for the 
screening program before a case is disposed of by a screening panel. Any one judge may 
reject a case from screening."). 
97. 6th Cir. I.O.P. 34(e) (no longer in force; superseded in revisions of Aug. 16, 2012, 
by I.O.P. that does not include this provision); see also D.C~ Cir. I.O.P. II(C)(2) (providing 
that '"Rule 340)' cases" may be decided without oral argument); D.C. Cir. I.O.P. IX(C)(l) 
(noting that cases can be marked by Staff attorney for potential decision without oral 
argument and describing process by which a single judge ,may grant oral argument but only 
the entire pane1 may deny it; and also noting that case may be moved from the list of 
'''Regular Merits; case[sT~ to the list of cases to be. decided without oral argument). 
98. 11th Cir. I.O.P. 34.1 (pertaining to 11th Cir. R. 34). 
99. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) (providing that decision about necessity of oral 
argument is to be made by three-judge panel). 
• 
• 
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permits a teleconference argument to be ordered by the court. 100 
Similarly, the Third Circuit's local rule expressly provides for 
the possibility of a video-conference argument at the request of a 
party.101 Such rules allow for greater oral advocacy and 
overcome the travel-time-and-cost argument often advanced as a 
reason for denial of oral argument. While they do not preserve 
all the benefits of live appellate oral argument, these 
technologically enabled arguments are certainly an improvement 
over a brief-only submission to the court. Alternatively, the 
Federal Circuit provides no similar opportunity, but it does offer 
a written substitute for oral argument: an additional opportunity 
to file a reply brief. 102 In addition, some circuits require that 
appeals denied oral argument be unanimous on the merits, 
presumably as a safeguard against denJing argument on truly 
close or sharply contested legal issues. 10 
The modem rule structure, taking into account the national 
rule and local rules and procedures, reveals a system in which 
oral argument is deemed important and is the default position, 
overcome only by a unanimous judgment of the court. But the 
operational reality is that very few appeals are set for oral 
argument. Even when granted, oral argument is much shorter 
than in the past, a quarter of the time allotted a century ago. 104 
There is a tension within the circuits between the appellate ideal 
and the practical considerations in processing cases to 
disposition. Oral argument remains the ideal, but p.erhaps an 
ideal viewed as no longer attainable. 105 
The diminished number of oral arguments has so devalued 
the practice in the minds of some that it has led to a legislative 
call for even further reduction.106 Others have expressed regret 
100. 6th Cir. R. 34(g)(3). 
101. 3d Cir. R. 34.l(e) ("A party may request oral argument by video-conference."). 
102. Fed. Cir. R. 34(a) (captioned "Reply Brief Instead of Oral Argument" and 
petmitting appellant who neglected to file a reply brief in anticipation of oral argument to 
. file one if the case is not set for oral argument) . 
103. 4th Cir. I.O.P. 34.2; 11th Cir. R. 34-3(b)(3). 
104. See Part V, infra. 
105. Baker, supra n. 4, at 116-17. 
106. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight 
and the Courts, Chairman's Report on the Appropriate Allocation of Judgeships in the 
United States Courts of Appeals 10 (Mar. 1999) ("Courts with pennissive standards for 
granting oral argument, or which grant oral argument every time it is requested, should 
seriously consider modifying their policies so that the deciding judges might exercise 
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over this diminishment, and offered alternative rules or 
procedures to preserve oral argument. 107 Perhaps now the 
federal appellate courts can consider rebalancing their 
procedures in a manner that restores the traditional practice of 
oral argument. 108 
IV. VALUE OF ORAL ARGUMENT 
Oral argument benefits all stakeholders in the appellate 
system from the public, to the litigants and their counsel, to the 
judges and the court itself. Courts in crisis, or perceiving 
themselves to be in crisis, have developed non-argument 
procedures and reduced the rate of, and time for, oral 
argument. 109 The values implicit in appellate review are 
weakened or diluted. 11 0 
The modem appellate courts have been described as a 
decision factory: "briefs go in one end . . . and opinions come 
out the other end, without any chance for the public or the 
parties to understand who really decided the case and whether 
the decisionmakers truly understood the parties' concerns."111 It 
has been suggested that courts have "severely," "profoundly," 
and "possibly irredeemably" compromised the appellate system 
''by such roportionately high rates of denial of oral 
atmosphere of the late twentieth century has passed, perhaps a 
increased discretion not to hear cases they do not believe warrant oral argument."); see also 
Kravitz, supra n. 16, at 255 (quoting Chairman's Report, supra this note). 
I 07. Carrington, supra n. 16, at 17- 18 (expressing regret over the trend of fewer and 
briefer oral arguments and suggesting a process of invited waiver); Baker, supra n. 4, at 
116 (finding the federal courts' presumption against oral argument contrary to the written 
presumption underlying Rule 34 to be "rather Orwellian"); Martineau, supra n. l 0, at 30-
32 (describing a revised oral argument fonn that is less fonnal and more interactive). 
108. See Baker, supra n. 15, at 113-14 (describing the federal courts' trade-off of 
appellate justice for greater efficiency). 
109. Joe S. Cecil & Donna Stienstra, Deciding Cases without Argument: A Description 
of Procedures in the Courts of Appeals (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1985) (discussing screening 
procedures in federal courts of appeals, many instituted in connection with the increasing 
number of appeals filed in the 1980s). · 
llO. Oakley, supra n. 5, at 865. Professor Oakley identifies four such values under the 
following rubrics: error correction; institutional impact; a sense of participation; and 
legitimation of judicial decisions. · 
Ill. Kravitz, supra n. 16, at 263. 
112. Baker, supra n. 4, at 114. 
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careful re-evaluation of the costs and benefits of oral argument 
will lead to some revival of oral advocacy. 
Oral argument serves an important institutional and public 
function that is not provided by written submissions. Oral 
argument provides public visibility and institutional legitimacy, 
which is critically important: 
Positive public perception of the judiciary's role in 
American political life is indispensable to the effectiveness 
of the judicial branch. Indeed, this collective perception is 
the very source of judicial legitimacy, the sine qua non of 
our common law system. The concept of judicial 
legitimacy resides at the center of the constitutional 
doctrine of an independent judiciary and is the primary 
reason why people respect and obey the law. 113 
This visibility and public accountability is more important than 
ever. What was once perceived as the '~weakest'' branch is now 
perceived as increasingly powerful, and by some, as too 
powerful. 114 Calls for greater judicial accountability and 
transparency are likewise on the rise. Scholars continue to 
express concern about the bureaucratization and efficiency-
driven reforms of the federal ·courts. 115 If the public trust is to be 
113. Gregory C. Pingree; Where Lies the Emperor's Robe? An Inquiry· into the Problem 
of Judicial Legitimacy, 86 Or. L. Rev.l095, 1102 (2007) (collecting authorities). 
114. Compare The Federalist No. LXXVIII at 99 (Alexander Hamilton) in The 
Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States vol. 2 (Central L.J. Co. 
1914) (characterizing the judiciary as the branch of government "least dangerous to the 
political rights of the Constitution,., be-cause it "'has no influence over either· the sword or 
the purse," and asserting that "the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the thr.ee 
departtnents of power") (footnote omitted) with Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Michael 
Hennessy, Public Understanding of and St_tpport for the Courts: Survey Results, 95 Geo~ 
L.J. 899, 901 (2007) (citing data from two national surveys indicating that twenty-eight 
percent of Americans polled believed that the Supreme Court "has too much power''); see 
also e.g. Jonah Goldberg, Senate "Show Trial" is Product of a Too..-Powerful Court, USA 
Today llA (Jan. 11, 2006) (taking position that Senate's rigorous examination of nominees 
for Supreme Court is justified by significant power invested in Justices, here likened to 
"unelected monarchs"); Lance Eric Neff, Keys to the Kingdom~· Interpretive Power and 
Societal Influence During Two Ages, 7 Fla. Coastal L. Rev. 697, 700-02 & 701 n. 19 
(2006) (noting that the judiciary is commonly perceived as too powerful and relatively 
unaccountable). 
115. See generally Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks 
and Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 Ariz. St. L.J. 1 (2007); see also Marin K. 
LeVy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Managementin the Circuit 
Courts, 61 Duke L.J. 315 (2011); Penelope Pether, Inequitablelnjunctions: The Scandal of 
Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1435 (2004)~ 
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maintained, courts in the modern era must use transparent and 
reassuring procedures. Public visibility and accountability are 
especially important for the federal courts of appeals, the venue 
for the one and only appeal as of right in civil and criminal 
cases.116 Procedural shortcuts such as "dispositions on motion, 
an enlarged central staff, disposition without opinion, and 
unpublished opinions" make disposition without oral argument 
especially weighty. 117 The federal courts better serve their 
function by not only doing justice but showing justice being 
done. It is a principle "deeply rooted in the common law, that 
'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice. "'118 
Institutional legitimacy is negatively "affected by 
procedural shortcuts such as the elimination of oral 
argument." 119 Oral argument provides numerous benefits for 
litigants and their counsel. First, there is a value for the parties in 
facing the decisionmaker. The opportunity to physically see and 
interact with the federal government officials decidin9 one's 
case increases confidence in the system and the outcome. 20 Oral 
argument provides a sense of participation in a mutual, if 
adversarial, endeavor that is fundamental to the common law 
system. 121 It also '.'gives to litigants the assurance that judges 
themselves are making the decisions,"122 an assurance that is 
increasingly important in a staff-driven, bureaucratic, decision-
factory system. 
116. In 2010 and 20 11 , of the 282,895 cases filed in federal district courts, 55,992 
appeals were taken to the courts of appeals (twenty percent), and only 170-eighty-six for 
full argument and eighty-four for decision without argument were taken by the Supreme 
Court (.06 percent) during the 2010 Tenn. See 2011 AO Report, supra n. 2, at 58, 59, 119 
(tbl. A-1: "Supreme Court of the United States-Cases on Docket, Disposed of, and 
Remaining on Docket at Conclusion of October Tenns, 2006 Through 2010"; tbl. B: "U.S. 
Courts of Appeals Appeals Commenced, Tenninated, and Pending During the 12-Month 
Periods Ending September 30, 2010 and 2011"; tbl. C: "U.S. District Courts Civil Cases 
Commenced, Tenninated, and Pending During the 12-Month Periods Ending September 
30, 2010 and 2011 "). 
117. Martineau, supra n. 10, at 13. 
118. Levine v. U.S., 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960) (quoting Offutt v. U.S., 348 U.S. 11, 14 
( 1954)). 
119. Jerry Goldman, Appellate Justice Economized: Screening and Its Effect on 
Outcomes and Legitimacy in Restructuring Justice: The Innovations of the Ninth Circuit 
and the Future of the Federal Courts 140 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., Cornell U. Press 1990). 
120. Carrington, supra n. 16, at 17-18. 
121. /d. 
122. /d. at 17; see generally Pether, Sorcerers, supra n. 115. 
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Second, oral argument provides an interactive opportunity 
for parties to focus the panel's collective attention on the case's 
most important points, to respond to the court's. issues of 
greatest concern, and to address issue that arise out of the 
consideration of the case that were not apparent during the 
briefing. 123 Unlike written submissions, which, as Socrates 
bemoaned, cannot address the varied questions and values of the 
reader, oral argument allows a party a fuller, more meaningful 
interaction. 124 Third, the most direct benefit is the opportunity to 
influence the outcome. 125 Judges have certainly given the 
indication that oral argument does affect their decisions. 126 
When asked about the importance of oral argument Justice 
Jackson stated that "the justices would answer unanimously that 
now, as traditionally, they rely heavily on oral presentations," 
and adde-d that "it .alwa · s is of the highest,- and often of 
come to a different conclusion with oral argument than they 
would have without it, oral argument has a significant ability to 
affect the outcome of cases and the course of precedent. 128 
Additionally, oral argument rovides an opportunity to 
the outcome itself is unchanged, broadening or narrowing the 
breadth of the court's opinion may result from oral argument.130 
For a case sent back for retrial or rehearing, the details of the 
123. Martineau, supra n. 10, at 17-18. 
124. Plato, supra n. 19, at 191 (noting that written words "do not know to whom they 
should or should not speak; and if they are mistreated or unjustly slandered, they always 
require the creator of their being to rescue them"). 
125. Martineau, supra n. 10, at 17. 
126. Myron R. Bright & Richard S. Arnold, Oral Argument? It May Be Crucial! 10 
A.B.A. J. 68, 70 (Sept. 1984) (reporting that in a ten-month study, Judge Bright found oral 
argument changed his mind in thirty-one percent of cases and Judge Arnold found that oral 
argument changed his mind in seventeen percent); Jolm M. Harlan, What Part Does the 
Oral Argument Play in the Conduct of an Appeal? 41 Cornell L.Q. 6, 6 (1955) (asserting 
that "the lawyer who depreciates the oral argument as an effective-instrument of appellate 
advocacy, and stakes all on his brief~ is making a great mistake''). 
. . 
127. A Good Quarrel:~ supra n. 57, at 4-5. 
128. Rex E. Lee, Oral Argument in the Supreme Court; 12 A.B.A. J .. 60, 60 (Supp. June 
15, 1986) (noting that "there are cases in which the oral argument can change some votes, 
and you cannot assum-e that your case will not be one of them"). 
129. /d. 
130. ld. 
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court's opinion may have a significant effect on the later 
proceedings. 
Judges also benefit from oral argument. They benefit from 
greater institutional legitimacy and the accountability that comes 
with visible judicial involvement. But holding oral argument 
also provides other advantages. First, the interactivity benefits 
judges in their understanding of the cases before them. 131 It 
allows judges to probe issues omitted from the briefs, whether 
those omissions are intentional or inadvertent. 132 Oral argument 
can serve an important role in clarifying the matter at hand 133 
Litigants often speak past each other in their briefs, owing to 
their different perspectives on the case, and oral argument 
allows judges to focus the opposing positions. Another 
ambiguity or omission that may occur in appellate briefs is the 
effect of a proposed ruling on the body of precedent. This is an 
issue that the parties may not have raised for tactical reasons or 
simply because they do not view it as sufficiently important. At 
oral argument, a court can pose hypotheticals examininf how 
each party's proposed holding would affect future cases. 13 
Finally, there are professional benefits to conducting oral 
arguments. A robust oral argument practice can help to avoid 
judicial isolation, increase each judge's interactions with the 
fellow judges, including visiting judges and those sitting by 
designation. Oral argument can impress upon judges the 
humanity, gravity, and importance of their work, which may in 
turn improve both the quality of judicial decisions and judicial 
job satisfaction. 
Arrayed against these important values, the diminution in 
the frequency and length of oral argument is a dubious trade for 
efficiency in case disposition. Because of its importance to 
131. Stanley Mosk, In Defense of' Oral Argument, 1 J. App. Prac. & Process 25, 27 
( 1999). 
132. /d.; see also Rehnquist, supra n. 1, at 1021 (noting that lawyers can at oral 
argwnent "play a significant role in responding to the concerns of the judges, concerns that 
counsel won't always be able to anticipate in preparing the briefs"). 
133. Bright & Arnold, supra n. 126, at 68-69. 
134. See Myron H. Bright, The Changing Nature of the Federal Appeals Process in the 
1970s: A Challenge to the Bar, 65 F.R.D. 496, 506 (1975) (noting that oral aigument 
"allows the judges to ask questions to clear up any doubts that court might have about the 
case or the lawyer's approach to it"); Irving R. Kaufman, Appellate Advocacy in the 
Federal Courts, 19 F.R.D. 165, 171-72 (1979) (discussing importance of answers to 
questions posed by judges at oral argument). 
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appellate justice, oral argument should be more common and of 
greater length, and should offer sufficient opportunity for 
litigants to clarify, persuade, and have their day in court. 
V. DIMINISHED ORAL ARGUMENT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
In the Golden Age of oral argument, it was available for the 
asking and reportedly time was generously allocated at up to one 
hour per side. 135 Be.ginning in the 1980s, oral argument began to 
decline in frequency, and its length was shortened for most cases 
in the federal courts to twenty minutes per side. By 2011, the 
incidence of oral argument in the Eleventh Circuit had declined 
to a mere sixteen percent of cases, 136 a third of what it had been 
in the Fifth Circuit during the early 1980s, 137 and the 
presumptive time allotted was reduced to fifteen minutes per 
side. 138 
This decline is not unusual or atypical; there has been a 
roughly comparable nationwide decline in the frequency and 
length ?f oral argument throughout the federal courts of 
argued, 140 down from nearly two-thtrds tn the early 1980s, 1 1 
and the time allotted in most circuits was limited to "about 
fifteen minutes."142 The different methods appellate courts 
135. Carrington, supra n. 16, at 16-17. 
136. 2011 AO Report, supra n. 2. 
137. 1980 AO Report, supra n. 3, at tbl. S-1. The Eleventh Circuit was split off from the_ 
Fifth Circuit in 1980. See generally Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (1980). 
138. Telephone Interview by Daniel Drazen, Research Asst. to Profs. Cleveland & 
• 
Wisotsky, with Tresa Patterson, Deputy Clerk, Off. of the Clerk, U.S. Ct. ofApp. for the 
11th Cir. (July 3, 2012). 
139. Levy, supra n. 115, at 320-25 (finding_ a decline in oral arguments relative to the 
caseload as a whole to be a direct effect of the pressure on the judicial economy). This 
decline may also be a delayed result of the Supreme_ Court's ruling in FCC v. WJR, the 
Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265, 275-76 (1949) ("[D]ue process of law has never been 
a tern1 of fixed and invariable content. This is as true with reference to oral argument as 
with respect to other elements of procedural due process. For this Court has held in some 
situations that such argument is essential to a fair hearing, in others that argument 
submitted in writing is sufficient."). 
140 .. 2011 AO Report, supra n. 2. 
141. 1980AO Report, supra n. 3, attbl. S-1. 
142. Administrative· Office of the U.S. Courts, How the Federal Courts Work, The 
Appeals Process, http://www. uscourts. gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheF ederalCourts/ 
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~plement in reviewing thei~ casel~ads may have a si~ificant 
1mpact on whether a case wtll recetve oral argument.1 3 In the 
Eleventh Circuit, the percentage of oral argument cases in 2011 
was strikingly low at 15.8 percent,144 while in the D.C. Circuit, 
43.4 percent of cases received oral argument.145 
In interpreting the data, the difference between civil and 
criminal cases must be noted. In 1989, criminal appeals 
nationwide were argued 55.3 percent of the time, while civil 
appeals were argued 46.1 percent of the time.146' In the 1997-98 
court year, the percenta9es were approx~ately_ e9-ual at just 
over forty percent each.14 By 2011, the ratto of cnmtnal appeals 
receiving oral argument had fallen to _23.1 percent, while civil 
appeals held higher at 36.4 percent~148 For whatever reason or 
reasons, the screening process filters out more criminal appeals 
and favors civil appeals for oral argument. 
Is there a hole in the data? The analysis set forth here 
isolates_ the percentage of cases, civil and criminal, as the 
measurable variable. The implicit assumption is that the 
percentages reflect the screening processes and not some other 
variable. We cannot rule out the possibility that some other 
factor may be at work, perhaps, for example, a decline in the 
percentage of appellate attorneys requesting that oral argument 
be set. This is not an impossible explanation, but one that is 
extremely unlikely. There is a compelling litigation preS1.1mption 
that a party who has lost in the trial court and seeks reversal on 
appeal should as a matter of course request oral argument. It is a 
HowCourtsWorkffheAppealsProcess.aspx (accessed Sept. 21, 2012; copy on file with 
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process) [hereinafter The Appeals Process]. 
143. Levy, supra n. 115, at J 17. 
144. 2011 AO Report; supra n. 2 
145. /d. 
146. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1989 Annual Report of the Director: 
Judicial Business of the United States Courts, at tbl. B-1 A. 
147. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1998 Annual Report of the Director: 
Judicial Business of the United States Courts 95 (tbl. Bl-A: "U.S. Courts of Appeals:~· 
Appeals Commenced, Tetminated, and Pending; by Nature of Suit or Offense, in Appeals 
Arising From the U.S. District Courts During the Twelve-Month Period Ended September 
30, 1998"). 
148. 2011 AO Report, supra n. 2, at 65 (tbl. B-IA: "U.S. Courts of Appeals Appeals 
Commenced, Terminated, and Pending, by Nature of Suit or Offense, in Appeals Arising 
from the U.S. District Courts During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2011 "). 
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protocol of good appellate practice.149 Malpractice 
considerations also militate in favor of such requests, lest an 
attorney who waives oral argument be deemed negligent. And 
attorneys who bill by the hour as private counsel or under the 
CJA ha\'e a financial incentive to do what is in their clients' best 
interests anyway. Although it cannot be proved on the records 
kept by the clerks of court, which do not systematically report 
on such requests, a dramatic fall-off in the percentage of 
appellate counsel requesting oral argument is not a reasonable or 
sensible inference. Conunon sense strongly suggests that the 
operative variable is the courts' screening out an increasing 
proportion of cases for oral argument because they think it is not 
particularly valuable_ 
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR THE RETURN TO A GREATER ROLE 
FOR ORAL ADVOCACY 
A. Better Screening 
Better and more timely input from the attorneys could go a 
long way toward restoring a higher proportion of oral argument 
cases. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(l) states: "Any 
party may file, or a court may require by local rule, a statement 
explaining why oral argument should, or need not, be 
permitted."150 The Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all require 
a statement re arding oral argument be included in both parties' 
statement form, from both parties, within fourteen days of the 
filing of the appellee's last brief. 152 The First, Third, Fourth, 
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have rules statin9 that a party "may" 
include a statement regarding oral argument. 53 Such a statement 
149. See e.g. Carole C. Berry, Effective Appellate Advocacy: Brief Writing and Oral 
Argument 125 (2d ed., West 2003) ("never ever waive oral argument") (emphasis in 
original). 
150. Fed. R. App. P. 34 (a)(l). 
151. 5th Cir. R. 28.2.3; lOth Cir. R. 28.2 (C)(4); 11th Cir. R. 28-l(c). 
152. 2d Cir. R. 34.l(a) (providing in addition that "[f]ailure to timely file the Oral 
Argument Statement Fonn signifies that the party does not seek oral argument"). 
153. 1st Cir. R. 34.0(a); 3d Cir. R. 34(b) (providing that "Any party ... has the right to 
file a statement with the court setting forth the reasons why . . . oral argument should be 
heard"); 4th Cir. R. 34(a); 6th Cir. R. 34(a} (providing that "[a] party desiring oral argument 
) 
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should be required in all courts in all cases, as it surely provides 
information relevant to the decision whether to grant oral 
argument and to allocate an appropriate amount of time for it if 
granted. Presently, the statements submitted by counsel are often 
boilerplate of the aid--the-decisional-process~of-the-court type. 
Attorneys should be required to actually argue the need for oral 
·argument, briefly, by giving an overview of the case: How many 
issues? How complex? Is there a novel question, one of first 
impression, or an ambiguity as to the applicable rule because of 
panel inconsistency? To what extent are the parties agreed on 
the facts and the applicable rules? Is it a summary judgment 
appe.al or a full-record appeal from a jury verdict? 
Arguably, staff attorneys engage in some ofthese inquiries, 
but theirs is not the perspective of an advocate.154 Staff attorneys 
in the D.C. Circuit, for example, may also rate a case they have 
recommende-d for oral argument as either complex, regular, or 
regular/plus based on its level of complexity~ 155 But this method 
further exemplifies a flaw in the process because their 
knowledge of the case is not comparable to that of appellate 
counsel; staff attorneys have not lived with the case and have 
not read the record. And the forms that get filed by counsel early 
must include a statement in the brief explaining why the court should hear oral argument"); 
7th Cir R. 34 (f). 
154. D.C. Cir. R. 340) (stating that staff attorneys screen new appeals to detennine what 
treatment is appropriate); 1st Cir. I.O.P. VI(A) (stating "(i]nitially, the staff attorney 
reviews the briefs" and consults with a panel of three judges to decide if the case warrants 
oral argument); 3d Cir. I.O.P. 2.1 (stating that a panel "detennines whether there will be 
oral argument and the amount of time allocated"); 4th Cir. R. 34(a) (stating "[i]f all of the 
judges of the panel to which a pending appeal has been referred conclude that oral 
argument is not to be allowed, they may make any appropriate decision without :oral 
argument including, but not limited to, affinnance or reversal"); 5th Cir. I.O.P. (A) 
(pertaining to 5th Cir. R. 34 and stating that judges screen cases with assistance from the 
staff attorney); 6th Cir. I.O.P. 34(a)(4) (stating that "[p]anels detennine which of the cases 
assigned to them will receive oral argument and which do not require oral argwnent"); 6th 
Cir. l.O. P. 202(c )(3) (stating that the staff attomey;s office "provides legal support to the 
court as a whole, rather than to individual judges by making dispositional 
re_commendations in those cases that the court has decided do not require oral argument 
under Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)"); 8th Cir. R. 34A (a) (stating that the chief judge appoints 
. . 
either a clerk, senior staff attorney, or panel of judges to· screen cases); lOth Cir. 
Practitioner's Guide VIII(B) (stating that H[i]n screening, the judges review each case to 
determine whether it should be directed to the oral argument calendar, assigned to a 
separate calendar without oral argument, or whether the screening panel should dispose of 
the matter"); 11th Cir~ R. 34-3(e) (stating that panels of three judges screen appeals to 
detemtine if they warrant oral argument). 
155. Levy~ supra. n. 115, at 335. 
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on as docketing statements or appeal infortnation statements are 
quite limited and in some cases superficial. They are also timed 
too early to be really informative. The optimum timing for the 
statements of counsel regarding oral argument is the date when 
the reply brief is filed or could have been filed. At that point, the 
issues between the parties are joined, the conflicting positions 
are clear, and the nuances known. 
An example of a form with some depth is that used by the 
Second Circuit as its Civil Pre-Argument Statement (Form C). 156 
It requires an addendum including a brief description of the 
nature of the action; the result below; a copy of the notice of 
appeal and the lower court docket sheet; and copies of all 
relevant opinions and orders forming the basis for the appeal. A 
second required addendum must list "the issues proposed to be 
raised on appeal, as well as the ap~licable appellate standard of 
review for each proposed issue." 57 The problem is that the 
required disclosures come too soon, only fourteen days from 
filing the notice of appeal. Appellate counsel coming into the 
case anew would have little of substance to say before reading 
the trial transcript, which, absent daily copy, would not 
generally be available to him or her in time to be read and 
analyzed. Even where the appellate lawyer was also trial 
counsel, he or she will rarely be able to specify all issues to be 
raised. The only safe answer to the fonn at the fourteen-day 
mark is something general like "Appellant proposes to raise all 
issues supported by the record on appeal after he has received 
and read it." 
B. One Size Does Not Fit All. 
Cases assigned to the oral argument track are typically 
slotted in at standard length, for that circuit, most commonly 
fifteen minutes. 158 It appears from our survey of the local rules 
and lOPs that most courts do not give systematic attention to or 
156. See United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Clerk's Office, Civil 
Appeal Pre-Argu1nent Statement (Form C), http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/clerk/Fonns_and_ 
instructions/pdf/Fonn%20C%20revised%203-ll.pdf. 
157. /d. 
158. The Appeals Process, supra n. 142. 
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differential weight in calendaring a case for oral argument to a 
multi-party appeal. Probably, this is due to the fact that many 
multi-party appeals involve the same issue for more than one 
party, so there is no distinct analysis required by the "extra" 
party's presence in the appeal. 
But this is often not true. Criminal appeals in particular 
have the potential to present co-appellants who were all 
defendants below arguing very different points on appeal. Take, 
for example, a conspiracy case in which the "kingpin" defendant 
is convicted upon the testimony of cooperating witnesses with 
direct knowledge of his crimes; his issues on appeal are not 
insufficiency of the evidence but may arise from improper 
restrictions on cross examination, or improper admission of 
prior crimes evidence under Rule 404(b ), or other procedural 
issues. By contrast, a secondary co-conspirator may have 
grounds to argue that the evidence of his or her role in the 
conspiracy was so slight that Rule 29 judgment of acquittal 
should have been granted. A third defendant may or may not 
have appellate issues to challenge the conviction but may argue 
that the sentence imposed under the advisory guidelines was 
unreasonable in length or involved an incorrect application of a 
particular guideline. 
In this scenario (drawn from our own real-life experience), 
you have three defendants with three distinct legal issues on 
appeal who have very little overlap in their cases except as co-
conspirators under the indictment. And the tirne allowed for this 
oral argument was fifteen minutes to be divided among the three 
appellants. Recall that the case was deemed substantial enough 
to warrant oral argument in the first place. But the allocation of 
fifteen minutes dilutes or undermines that initial judgment Of 
course, under the rules, a motion to extend or enlarge the oral 
argument was permitted, 159 and was made. It was denied. The 
result? The first party argued for seven minutes, the second 
argued for four minutes, the third argued for two, and the 
remaining two minutes were reserved for rebuttaL This is hardly 
consistent with the grand tradition of oral advocacy that 
prevailed in the federal courts not so long ago. 
159. See lith Cir. LO.P. to 11th Cir. R. 34-4, at 11. 
( 
• 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Oral argument is, as Chief Justice Rehnquist has described 
it, ''a three dimensional experience," in which the litigants, 
counsel, and the court engage in a public, interactive, collegial, 
adversarial, serious, and immediate experience that cannot be 
duplicated by exclusive reliance . on written briefs.160 It is an 
unparalleled opportunity for litigants, through counsel, to face 
those who will decide their fate, for lawyers to make certain that 
their arguments are understood, and for judges to understand the 
facts, legal arguments, and human dimensions of the case to be 
decided. Appellate oral argument, at its best, is vital to a three-
dimensional decisionmaking process. We do not endeavor to 
argue that speech has primacy over writing in communicative or 
persuasive value, nor that courts in the United States should 
revert to an exclusively oral legal practice. We believe, however, 
that there is significantly greater value in oral argument than 
presently recognized by federal appellate court rules and 
practice. We recommend that this value be more fully 
appreciated and that the federal appellate courts make greater 
use of oral argument. 
160. Rehnquist, supra n. I, at 1022. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1 
Time Allotted Each Side for Oral Ar ~ument* 
Circuit Time Allotment 
• 
First Circuit Nonnally no more than 15 minutes 
Second Circuit Generally 1 0 minutes or less 
Third Circuit UsJ.Ially 15 minutes 
Fourth Circuit Normally 20 minutes 
Fifth Circuit Most cases are allowed 20 minutes 
Sixth Circuit 15 minutes 
Seventh Circuit Many cases get 10 to 20 minutes 
Eighth Circuit Usually 10, 15, or 20 minutes 
Ninth Circuit Generally 10 to 20 minutes 
Tenth Circuit 15 minutes 
Eleventh Circuit Typically 15 minutes 
D.C. Circuit 15 minutes is most common 
. 
Federal Circuit Ordinarily 15 minutes 
*See 1st Cir. R. 34 (c)( I); United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Clerk's 
Office, Oral Argument, http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/clerk Fonns_and_instructions/How_ 
to_ appeaVCivil_case/Oral_argument.htm (accessed Oct. 16, 2012; copy on file with 
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process); 3d Cir. lOP 2.1; 4th Cir. R. 34(d); 5th Cir R. 
34.11; 6th Cir R. 34(f)(l); 7th Cir. Practitioner's Guide, XXVII(B); 8th Cir. R. 34A(b); 9th 
Cir. Court Structure and Procedures, E(7); lOth Cir. Practitioner's Guide, VIII(C)(l); 
Telephone Interview by Daniel Drazen, Research Asst. to Prof. Wisotsky, with Tresa 
Patterson, Deputy Clerk, Off. of the Clerk, U.S. Ct. of App. for the 11th Cir. (July 3, 2012); 
D.C. Cir. lOP XI(C)(l). 
• 
• 
• 
. 
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Table 2 
Percentage of Appeals Terminated on the Merits, by Category 
~All Circuits'* 
Criminal Criminal Civil Civil 
Year roral Ar2ument Submitted on Briefs O.ral Araument Submitted on Briefs 
1989 55.3 44.7 46.1 53.9· 
1990 53.3 46.7 41.9 58.1 
1991 50.8 49.2 41.8 58.2 
1992 50.1 49.9 41.8 58.2 
1993 47.0 53.0 36.6 63.4 
1994 48.4 51.6 37.4 62.6 
1995 48.2 51.8 36.6 63.4 
1996 44.8 55.2 36.2 63.8 
1997 40.4 59.6 
. 
40.6 
. 
59.4 
1998 41.2 58.8 41.9 58.1 
1999 39.5 60.5 40.6 59.4 
2000 36.2 63.8 40.4 59.6 
2001 33.7 66.3 39.5 60.5 
2002 30.2 69.8 40.1 59.9 
2003 30.1 69.9 39.6 60.4 
2004 31.0 69.,0 41.6 58.4 
2005 28.3 71.7 41.8 58.2 
2006 25.3 74.7 40.3 59.7 
2007 26.3 73.7 39.7 60.3 
• 
2008 29.4 70.6 41.3 58.7 
2009 24.3 75.7 
' 
41.2 58.8 
2010 24.6 75.4 37.9 62.1 
2011 23.1 76.9 36.4 63.6 
*See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1989-2011 Annual Reports of the 
Director: Judicial Business of the United States Courts (tbl. B-lA). 
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Table 3 
Average Percentage of Appeals Terminated on the Merits 
after Oral Argument or Submission on Briefs 
(All Circuits)* 
Year Oral Argument Submission on 
Briefs 
1971 65.8 34.2 
1972 52.6 47.4 
1973 59.4 40.6 
1974 61.2 38.8 
1975 61.5 38.5 
1976 60.5 39.5 
1977 54.8 45.2 
1978 59.2 40.8 
1979 61.3 38.7 
1980 62.9 37.1 
1981 69.2 30.8 
1982 66.9 33.1 
1983 63.9 36.1 
1984 60.8 39.2 
1985 56.3 43.7 
1986 53.8 46.2 
1987 50.7 49.3 
1988 51.2 48.8 
. 
1989 48.4 51.6 
1990 45.1 54.9 
1991 44.4 55.6 
1992 43.9 56.1 
1993 39.7 60.3 
1994 40.6 59.4 
1995 39.9 60.1 
*See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1971-2011 Annual Reports of the 
Director: Judicial Business of the United States Courts (tbl. S-1 ). 
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. 
Table 3 (continued) 
Average Percentage of Appeals Terminated on the Merits 
after Oral Argument or Submission on Briefs 
(All Circuits) 
Year Oral Ar ~ument Submission on Briefs 
1996 38.7 61.3 
1997 40.1 59.9 
1998 41.0 59.0 
1:999 37.1 62.9 
2000 35.4 64.6 
. 
2001 32.3 67.7 
2002 32.9 67.1 
2003 32.5 67.5 
2004 31.5 68.5 
2005 30.1 69.9 
2006 25 .,9 74J 
2007 27.3 72.7 
2008 30.3 69.7 
2009 28.5 71.5 
2010 26.4 73.6 
2011 25.'1 74.9 
